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ABSTRACT 
Energy is one an important class of traded commodities. The particular feature of 
energy is that about 85% of energies consumed are produced from non-renewable SOUf-
ces. While the structure of energy market is complex, in general we have competitive 
rnarkets. Sorne exceptions like OPEe cartel in fact work now towards stabilization of 
market for oil, with periodical adjustrnent in production to keep prices within accepta-
ble corridor. It is important to understand that not only real energy but also paper ener-
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gy (like future contracts and options) are traded. The aim of the article is to analyse the 
main recent events to understand the specifics of energy markets and macroeconomic 
extemalities derived from price instability, as well as to point towards sorne solutions 
to stabilise markets and trends within the current economic crisis. 
Keywords: Energy markets, cornmodities, volatility prices 
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RESUMEN 
La energía es una de las principales cornmodities comercializables, cuya particu-
laridad es que entorno al 85% de la energía consumida es producida con recursos no 
renovables. La estructura del mercado energético es compleja y en general sujeta a 
mercados competitivos y a precios volátiles. Existen excepciones como el cartel de la 
OPEP que dota el mercado de una estabilidad de precios ajustando periódicamente la 
producción, a pesar que en los últimos años ha florecido el comercio de contratos es-
tructurados «energía de papel» (futuros y opciones) que ha conllevado sobrereacciones 
y volatilidad de precios. 
El objetivo del trabajo es analizar los hechos recientes en este mercado en aras 
a entender sus especificidades propias y las extemalidades macroeconómicas que se 
derivan de la inestabilidad de precios apuntando algunas soluciones preventivas de 
nuevas crisis energéticas 
Palabras clave: Mercado energético, cornmodities, volatilidad de precios 
Clasificación JEL: e51 , G13, Q56 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The main traded primary energies include crude oil, natural gas and coal. Electricity 
is secondary energy and can be produced from both renewable (hydro, wind, etc) and 
non-renewable sources. It is less important for intemational trade, with intemational 
trade substantially lower than production, and that is why we will not consider it, but 
focus on oil, gas and coal. 
Since primary energies have very heterogeneous distribution in the world (see Fig. l 
for reserve-production ratios for oil), and the intemational trade flows represent a subs-
tantial fraction of production with the tendency to grow in future. That is why price 
stabilization in the world energy markets represents one of the policy objectives. 
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In the years 2007 and 2008, the discussion in this market focused on the deep 
consequences of energy and raw material price increase on consumers and inflation as 
well as its global impact on trade pattems and the intemational monetary system, since 
cornrnodities had become an investment asset replacing financial ones. However, with 
the crisis becoming deeper, we have seen a dramatic decline of agricultural, mineral 
and energy cornrnodity prices since 2008. 
In the following, the price evolution and instability in tbe energy markets in the last years 
are analysed, as well as the difficulty to stabilise the global energy market. Excessive market 
volatility produces negative extemalities for both producers and consumers and is partly res-
ponsible for macroeconomic crisis. In this respect, we will also talk about what can be done 
to stabilise the market. Finally, sorne perspectives and different conclusions are given. 
2. INSTABILITY OF THE ENERGY MARKET. FORCES DruVING 
ENERGY MARKETS 
The prices of energies have experienced sorne considerable volatility in the last years. 
With the outbreak of the crisis in auturnn 2008 and its deepening since 2009, we have 
seen a dramatic evolution of nominal prices in a considerable number of agricultural, 
mineral and energy cornrnodities. Historically, they had been keeping a low price pattem 
in real terms and even followed a downward trend in the 1980s and 1990s. However, 
the price oscillation between 2008 and 2009 was unprecedented, in part due to financial 
innovation that has increased the depth (see Fig.2). In section 4 we will try to understand 
the microeconomics of instabilities tbrough the present functioning of financial markets. 
We need to understand how the markets for energy work, and what drives the prices. 
Classical microeconomics considers static markets and focuses on differences between 
perfect competition, oligopoly and monopoly. Indeed, we have such cartels like OPEC, 
and in 1970-80s it was partly responsible for peaks in prices associated with oil crisis. 
However, at present its role is positive and it tends to stabilize markets by reducing 
output when prices are falling (see Fig. 3). 
It is necessary to distinguish between pricing mechanisms and the underlying for-
ces, which determine prices, or, in other words, to distinguish between how prices 
are deterrnined and what determines prices. The first is about the organisation of tra-
de, exchange and marketplaces, including access, and the ways prices are negotiated, 
cornmunicated and made public. This does not necessarily give an insight into what 
inftuences decision-making by buyers and sellers, nor about the resulting market ba-
lance and price leve!. Oil and gas have many characteristics that distinguish them from 
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other cornmodities, such as: high uncertainty linked to resource deve10pment and the 
high specificity of investment, the finiteness of the resource, the ofien highly inelastic 
demand for energy and its interaction with concentration and capacity restrictions on 
the supply side, market imperfections such as unavoidable extemalities [1,p.42]. The 
underlying structure of oil and gas trade has an influence on pricing mechanism. We 
need to use multidisciplinary approach also taking into account such factor as finite-
ness ofresources and the role of spatial factor in price formation (section 3). 
There are two different approaches to the economy of finite resources. The Ricardian 
approach does not emphasise the limits on resources, but rather focuses on the recog-
nition that, as resources become more difficult to exploit, their development requires 
greater capital spending and technological development, and that a resource rent results 
only from cost differences between different production sites. This approach is ofien 
used as a justification for a cost-based energy pricing system. US economist Hotelling 
(1931) assumed finiteness of a given resource and investigated the consequences for the 
inter-temporal optirnisation of resource development. Hotelling's theorem clairns that the 
depletion path for a finite resource will be such that the annual revenue follows the inter-
est rate, and that the resulting price path is such that an altemative (backstop technology) 
will be an economic substitute when the finite resource is depleted [1, p.45]. 
FIGURE l.-Reserve-production ratios for oil. We see not many important producers in the world 
and high variation in RIP ratios that will cause less competition in future as resources will dry. 
bp 
Reserves-to-Product ion Ratios 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 111 Itllll U . I 111 11111 . 
20 
o ULlllILll.l-.uLU.l.ll.l._ 
OPEC World FSU OIher 
Source: BP Statistical Review 2009. 
THE DIFFICULTY TO STABILIZE ENERGY MARKEfS 
FIGURE 2.- In year 2008, we observed huge peak in prices of all primary energies. 
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FIGURE 4.-Prices for natural gas are regional in nature because transport cost is substantia1ly 
higher !han for oil. The peaking here comes not from market clearing procedure at regional 
markets, but more due to price formula, using lagged oil price 
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There are many forces driving the stability of energy markets. Apart from the fi-
niteness of resources for non-renewable energy and contrast between Ricardian and 
Hotelling rent, we need to take into account spatial (section 3) and temporal (section 
4) factors. They represent two altemative self-organizing forces. While an arbitrage on 
spatial markets is costly (it involves shipping cost and thus bring heterogeneous spatial 
pattem, at least for bulky goods, with low price/weight ratio), the temporal arbitrage 
has negligible cost, due to the development of global financial markets with such ins-
truments as futures and options. Thus, money can flow across periods virtually at no 
cost (except for time discount). This capital inflow can be substantially larger than 
volume of physically traded good. Thus, we have to distinguish between trade in paper 
oil and real oil, with the first trade having sometimes much larger volumes. Tbe free 
ftow of short term speculative capital can ofien have destabilizing effect and increase 
volatility in energy prices l . On the other hand, long term contracts (like those typical 
I The recent l ()1h lAEE European conference (Vienna, 7-10 September 2009) had a special 
plenary session on "Energy, speculation and financia! crisis", witb Fatih Birol (lEA Chief econo-
mist) and Georg Erdmann (lAEE President), keynote speakers, discussing this issue. 
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for gas markets) tend to reduce price volatilüy. We wiU consider this issue in more 
detail in section 4. 
Clearly, different economic market structures also affect price stability. For exam-
pie, agricultural markets are driven by perfect competition market pattems, with many 
seUers but no effect on the global market for that particular producto Contrary, the 
energy and mineral markets come close to an oligopolistic or oligopsonistic market. In 
these cases, the decisive point is whether producers usually depend heavily on selling, 
which may induce them to try and seU even higher amounts in the light of price reduc-
tions, but also if the commodity is contracted through one or several exchange markets 
acting as a monopsony or oligopsony. 
3. SPATIAL FACTORS IN ENERGY MARKETS 
Historically, space and geography played more important role in formation of 
pricing pattem than today. With the development of transport technologies and re-
duction of tariffs a possibility to have unique world price for particular goods have 
emerged. lndeed, a century ago delivery costs of aU goods was a significant fraction 
of their price, leading to substantial spatial price variation. Today intemational price 
variation for hi-tech goods no longer depends on geography, but more on differen-
ces in tariff policies. Agricultural goods had clear spatial price pattem a century 
ago, driven by heterogeneity in climatic conditions, demand density and substantial 
transport costo The emergence of stock exchanges where these commodities can be 
traded had a positive role of risk diversification for consumers (who no longer beca-
me dependent on bad weather in particular region) and formed world price. Along 
with the reduction in relative weight of transport cost this brought a unique world 
price (since trade became concentrated in few world financial centres, like New York 
or London). 
For instance, the production cost for gas, cement or wood is close to their shipping 
cost, so there will be a relevant price spread according to the country. However, in the 
case of oil, the price will rather depend on the crude type (WTI, OPEC, Brent, etc.) and 
its refinement cost, and not so much on the shipping cost, which is relatively low. 
If we concentrate on primary energies, we can conclude that gas and coal has re-
gional price pattem (due to substantial role of transport in total cost). Looking at Fig.3, 
we see that regional prices for gas coevolve, but at any time cross-regional differential 
is substantial . It cannot be fully eliminated despite the existence of spatial arbitrage 
opportunity, due to high transport cost. Note that practically all natural gas available 
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for spatial arbitrrage comes from LNG technology, which requires much higher in-
vestment than oil, While for sea transport of oil we need only tankers, for cross-sea 
delivery of natural has we need special cryogenic vessels along with costly liquefaction 
and regasification plants on the coast. 
4. THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS IN PRICE (DE)STABILIZATION 
Initially, energy has been traded only on spot markets with physical delivery. Oil 
trade started in 1859 in Pensylvania (US). The volatility of the early days carne from 
heterogeneity in production, due to depletion of old fields and new discoveries in ran-
dom moments. Before 1970s, only spot rnarkets for oil existed, and rnost of contracts 
(especially those served by OPEe countries) have been long termo [1, ch.3] Future 
markets for crude oil were formed in 1973. The initial objective of forward and future 
markets was to reduce price volatility. However, speculation also takes place in the 
forward market. A cargo of crude oil can be transferred from one trader to another 
many times between loading and delivery [3, p.80]. 
The futures for natural gas emerged in 1990 at NYMEX. At present, there exists 
two types of trading energy: with physical delivery (physical) and without it (financial). 
At present, trade in oil futures substantially exceeds the volume of physical trade. In 
2007, about lA ofWTI (brand of crude) future positions at NYMEX have been hold by 
non-cornmercials, or speculators [3, Fig.14]. 
Option is another financial instrumento It first appeared in financial markets, but 
later moved to cornmodity markets. Other financial instruments can be produced from 
futures and options; they are called financial derivatives. When the capital accociated 
with derivatives substantially exceeds one associated with stocks, market volatility can 
be generated by rnarket itself. There was a tendency of growth of the volurne of deriva-
tives relative to the volume of stocks in all markets. Sorne researchers believe this to be 
one of the reasons for present financial crisis. 
Volatility has been always associated with oil markets. The paper of Wirl [2] repre-
sents a good survey and a bunch of rnathematical rnodels that can partly explain this 
phenomenon. However, they do not give explanation to the recent positive trend in oil 
prices (2000-2008), that ended in price peak in July 2008 (above 140 $/brl) followed 
by its collapse (to 40 $/brl). The presentation of Haas [3] reveals a potential mechanisrn 
for this phenomenon. First, it is well known that oil market is characterised with inelas-
tic demand in the short run, and in certain conditions with inelastic supply. If we draw 
these curves on graph, it is easy to see that small shifts in demand cause substantial 
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shift in equilibrium price. Next, he looks at the effect on financial speculative capital on 
demando When price rises, the capital inflow shifts demand to the right, and price rises 
more. Contrary, at the period of price decline, speculative capital moves away, shifting 
demand curve to tbe left, witb equilibrium price falling. Such mechanism can explain 
very sharp rise in oi! price in tbe first half of 2008, followed by sharp decline of this 
price in tbe second half of 2008. 
5. E VOLUTION OF PIuCES 
The prices of energies have declined in real terms in relation to the peak reached 
in the late 1970s. They did so quite strongly up to 2000, when they reached their rni-
nimum. The price increase between 2001 and 2008 was approximately 135%. Sorne 
reasons for this are the demand of Asian econornies for these goods, especially the rise 
of China as the intemational economy, as well as the reduction of the offer in the course 
of the advent of bio-fuels and adverse climatic conditions. 
It is al so true that the market overreacts out of three reasons: excessive global 
liquidity, i.e. lack of monetary policies and its effect on interest rates, the dollar 
effect, and finalIy speculative liquidity corning from other markets such as stock and 
property. 
The interest rate evolution during 2005-2008 has manifested itself in at least three 
ways: 
Increasing incentives for present versus future output, 
Increasing tbe opportunity cost of companies to keep stocks, 
Encouraging speculators to take positions in cornmodity contracts. 
In all three channels we find a negative association between interest rates and 
cornmodity prices in real terroso AIso, the price evolution can correlate with the on-
going depreciation of the dollar as compared to the euro in the 2003-2008 periods 
(Fig 5). The underIying idea of the dollar effect is that changes in the real value of 
the US currency imply ftuctuations in intemational relative purchasing power. Thus, 
a depreciation of that currency means less purchasing power in terms of energies in 
the dollar zone. 
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FIGURE 5.-Evolution of the dollar and commodity price volatility. 2003-2008. 
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Finally, due to downward expectations in the financial and housing markets (which 
used as an escape for many investors), the year 2008 was dominated by the paper 
energies market; to be more precise, by the rise of futures negotiated in non-regulated 
electronic markets, where the volume of traded "paper energy" exceeded real trade 
flow by factor 20. This is easily observed with the Bank of Intemational Settlements 
data that show that toward rnid 2008, the total sum of derivatives contracts amounted 
to 10 triHion doHars, twenty times the 1998 value. Many of these contracts have been 
part of many investrnent funds indexed according to the evolution of the oil barrel price 
and that of other raw material s (mostly related to Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, 
Citigroup and JP Morgan). AH these derivatives have become an option for investors to 
protect themselves from inflation, and their profitability depended on self-accomplis-
hing expectations, so speculative activity has worked as an amplifier. 
In the rniddle of year 2008, the total sum of derivatives contracts amounted to 10 
trillion dollars, twenty times the 1998 value. These derivatives have become an option 
for investors to protect themselves from inflation. 
On the other side, the variability of primary commodity prices has its origin in pro-
duction and consumption elasticity being low in the short termo That is, the response pace 
of production is low given the fact that production decisions are ofien taken before prices 
are known. These decisions depend on price expectations and not on their realisatiorr. 
2 In the case of agriculture, these realisations can even cause giving up a harvest if the price 
of collecting it is higher than the total value expected from its sale. 
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At the same time, economic stakeholders base their price expectations on the past 
behaviour of this variable in sorne of these agricultural markets. Hence the possibility 
of strong production and price instability comes up, which later dissipates over time 
as information ffows on an ongoing basis between economic stakeholders. However, 
it may occur that price level and amount available tend to balance: out of a situation in 
which demand for the product in the initial stage is much higher than the amount offe-
red, it later tends to balance in the medium or long term due to offer and demand pres-
sure. But it rnay diverge ifthere are strong price ftuctuations, which fosters the absence 
of a balance point. This interaction process between expectations and reality creates an 
interplay between price and volume, known as "cobweb model" in econorrnc theory. 
Cornmodity price ftuctuations are based on demand shocks (out of industrial cycles 
linked to metal demand) and offer shocks. The amplitude of cornmodity price ftuctua-
tions in response to offer-related decisions taken with a given anticipation are usually 
based on and supply shocks. Within this context, the socioeconomic debate has been 
focusing on the considerable destabilising consequences of the increase of food and 
raw material prices that are difficult to handle from a national political perspective, 
which clearly shows a dilernma in social policies. 
6. MACROECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES FROM ENERGlES PRrCE 
INSTABILITY 
Negative externalities of energies price movements may vary according to the sort 
of energy and the economy involved. For instance, in developed econorrnes, energies 
do not represent a significant part of the consumption basket of households, as opposed 
to less developed economies - specifically, it amounts to only 10% in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Consumption basket of 
developing countries depend more on raw materials. For example, food arnounts to 
roughly 65% of the consumption basket in Sub-Saharan Africa and 30% in Asia, which 
may bring about food crises and deep macroeconomic imbalances (IMF, 2(07). 
Also tax revenue is affected by events in these markets, as shows the increasing 
importance for global finance of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF), the origin of which 
is often associated to public ownership of strategic cornmodities. 
Highly volatile prices create problems in implementing policies to stabilise and 
reduce dependence on cornmodities. The idea is that in the increase stage of the price 
cycle, the economy experiences a rise in exports, tax revenue and production, so the-
re are no political incentives to implement innovative measures aimed at diversifying 
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production, even if there are perhaps resources that may allow tackling them. Once 
prices decline, the political desire for having an influence on commodities will be hig-
her, but there will probably be not enough resources or a favourable context to act 
accordingly. 
However, given the interaction between supply and demand, strategies to stabilise 
these markets have been traditionally fuelled by a genuine interest of consumers and 
producers of commodities to protect themselves against the risk of price ftuctuation 
(IMF, 2007). This sort of presence in the futures rnarkets is associated to commercial 
action of stakeholders interested in the underlying physical asset. 
The demand of stakeholders interested in such assets, albeit using speculative me-
thods, would stabilise prices if they created reserves for more difficult times. Their 
demand would serve as a support against price decline, thus avoiding withdrawal by 
many producers who could now go on supplying future markets. If abundance turns 
into scarcity and prices rise, the withdrawn surpluses will reappear and be now sold at 
a higher price. Markets would stabilise and prices would not surge in the face of any 
eventuality. In this case, speculation would have a stabilising effect, very different from 
recent years in which the presence of financial investors has affected the dynamics of 
price adjustment in a non-linear way, with opposite effect of price destabilization. 
It must not be forgotten that according to the sort of commodity, the price will be 
more or less volatile. For instance, commodities with an oscillating offer due to c1imate 
reasons, such as agricultural products, are more volatile than those with a more stable 
offer, such as energy or minerals. Price stability of the former depends on the existence 
of substantial storage capacity, so in times of high production output enough reserves 
are created for periods of low production. Contrary, in the mineral or energy market, 
with finite and non-renewable goods, price stability is higher, with ftuctuations being 
demand-driven as the output cost is stable. In this respect, it needs to be pointed out 
that a high rigidity in short-term offer makes prices very unstable, that is, they undergo 
great variations at the slightest change in demando 
The different market structures also affect stability. Agricultural markets are driven 
by perfect competition market pattems, with many offers but no effect on the global 
market for that product. Contrarily, the energy and mineral markets come c10se to an 
oligopolistic or oligopsonistic market. In these cases, the decisive point is whether pro-
ducers usually depend heavily on seIling, wruch may induce them to try and seU even 
higher amounts in the Iight of price reductions, but also if the commodity is contracted 
through one or several exchange markets acting as a monopsony or oligopsony. 
Sometimes we have cumulative influence of different factors. For example, the com-
modity involves a rugh srupping cost and the supplier has control over distribution at 
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regionalleveL For instance, the output cost for gas, cement or wood is close to their ship-
ping cost, so there will be a substantial price spread across the globe, and prices may dif-
fer across countries and regions. However, in the case of oil, the price will rather depend 
on the crude type (WTI, OPEC, Brent, etc.) and its refinament cost, and not so much on 
the shipping cost, which is relatively low. Another important point is both national and 
intemational spread, which makes it difficult to take coordinated decisions. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The financial crisis emerged after explosion of bubbles (financial, housing and 
cornmodity).1t has caused defiation in energy prices, and the reversal is unlikely to occur 
in the short term, although long-term demand will contribute to a future price increase. 
With global economic deceleration and decreasing demand for raw materials, especia-
lly from emerging economies such as China (the biggest consumer in the world), ongoing 
energy price moderation is expected (despite the fact that have seen substantial recovery 
of oil price in 2009, from $40 to $70-80 per barrel), and stabilisation will be determined 
by output adjustment. In relation with oil, the OPEC has announced new voluntary res-
trictions on production. IEA (2009) has revised downwards its forecast on the speed of 
growth in consumption of different energies across globe in the coming decades. 
To surnmarise, the future evolution of energy markets will still depend on global 
demand, population growth, bio fuel production, energy prices, economic growth, crop 
yields and trade policies (tariff restrictions or benefits and direct subsidies ). 
This article has analysed the different options to stabilise these markets. The star-
ting point of the problem has to do with the impact of globalisation in energy markets 
in which the territorial and decision-taking area in politics (the nation state) does not 
coincide with the territorial area of economics (the market is the world). 
In this scenario, intemational capital movements, especially in the short term, will 
play a decisive role in financial markets, foreign exchange, the price of energy and 
others cornmodities and the effects of national macroeconomic stabilisation policies. 
However, financial markets themselves have to be reformed in the direction of higher 
efficiency and higher irnmunity towards emergence of new bubbles. 
With this starting point, it comes out that it is not feasible to keep national sovereig-
nty in conventional terms, have stable markets and fully participate in the globalisation 
process simultaneously. If every country pretends to act according to its own interests 
only, a typical prisoner's dilernma will be reached. In fact, this has been an evolution 
that has led to energy crises and growing instability in the markets over the last two 
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years, and this requires sorne reasonable social political mechanisms of stabilisation, 
coordination and compensation. 
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